We focus on decomposition of hard-masking real-time faulttolerant programs (where safety, timing constraints, and liveness are preserved in the presence of faults) that are designed from their fault-intolerant versions. Towards this end, motivated by the concepts of state predicate detection and state predicate correction, we identify three types of faulttolerance components, namely, detectors, weak δ-correctors, and strong δ-correctors. We show that any hard-masking program can be decomposed into its fault-intolerant version plus a collection of detectors, and, weak and strong δ-correctors. We argue that such decomposition assists in providing assurance about dependability and timepredictability of embedded systems.
INTRODUCTION
Dependability and time-predictability are two vital properties of most embedded (especially, safety/mission-critical) systems. Consequently, providing fault-tolerance and meeting timing constraints are two inevitable aspects of dependable real-time embedded systems. Thus, it is highly desirable to have access to methodologies to formally reason about and, hence, gain assurance of these aspects during the design and analysis of embedded systems. In the context of analysis, verification of fault-tolerant real-time embedded systems may be accomplished by illustrating the existence of constituents that (1) guarantee fault-tolerance, (2) ensure timing constraints, and (3) perform basic functionalities. With this motivation, we focus on the following question:
Can a real-time fault-tolerant program be decomposed into components that can assist in its verification?
In this paper, we answer this question affirmatively by broadening the theory of fault-tolerance components [5] to the context of real-time programs. The theory in [5] essentially separates fault-tolerance and functionality concerns of untimed systems. More specifically, the theory identifies two types of fault-tolerance components, namely detectors and correctors. These components are based on the principle of detecting a state predicate to ensure that program actions would be safe and correcting a state predicate to ensure that the program eventually reaches a legitimate state. We emphasize that since these components do not rely on detecting faults or correcting faults, they can be applied in cases where faults are not detectable (e.g., Byzantine faults).
In the context of real-time programs, we focus on decomposition of hard-masking [6] real-time fault-tolerant programs, where (1) (timing independent) safety, (2) timing constraints, and (3) liveness properties (including recovery to legitimate states) are met even in the presence of faults. We identify three types of components, namely, detectors, weak δ-correctors, and strong δ-correctors. We show that these three components are in turn responsible for meeting the three properties of hard-masking fault-tolerant programs. Our proofs are constructive in the sense that they assist in identifying and subsequently decomposing a given hard-masking program into its fault-intolerant version, detectors, and δ-correctors.
Intuitively, detectors and δ-correctors work as follows. Each of these components is specified using two predicates: a detection (respectively, correction) predicate and a witness predicate. The goal of the detector component is to detect whether the given detection predicate is true and subsequently satisfy the witness predicate. It is required that whenever the witness predicate is true, the detection predicate must be true as well. Thus, the fault-tolerant program can use the witness predicate of the detector to provide the desired fault-tolerance requirements. In case of a δ-corrector, the component restores the program to a state where the correction predicate is true within a bounded amount of time. The use of the witness predicate by the program is optional, as the program may not need to know when the program state is restored.
Since we focus on demonstrating the existence of these components in a given hard-masking program, our notion of decomposition differs from that in [5] . In particular, we precisely define what it means for a fault-tolerant program to reuse a fault-intolerant program. Furthermore, we formally define what it means for a fault-tolerant program to contain detectors and/or δ-correctors. We note that for assistance in analysis, it is necessary to ensure that the specification of the added components can be derived from the fault-intolerant version. Thus, in case of detectors, it is necessary to specify how the results of these components (intuitively, the conclusion that the predicate being detected is true) are syntactically used in the fault-tolerant real-time program. This part is not important in the context of a design methodology and, hence, is not formalized in [5] .
Although detectors and correctors have been found to be useful in the design of fault-tolerant programs 1 , their significance in analysis has not been evaluated except in empirical case studies. In these studies [11, 18] , decomposition of a fault-tolerant program into its components has been found valuable in formal verification of the program. Thus, we expect that an affirmative answer to existence of the components would significantly assist in analysis of real-time embedded fault-tolerant programs.
Organization.
First, we present related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we formally define real-time programs and specifications. Section 4 is dedicated to present our fault model and the notion of hard-masking fault-tolerance. Then, in Section 5 (respectively, 6), we present the notion of detector (respectively, δ-corrector) components, the concept of their containment in real-time programs, and their theory of decomposition. Finally, we make concluding remarks and discuss future work in Section 7.
RELATED WORK
The theory of detectors and correctors [5] was extended in [14] for safety-critical systems. In [20] , the authors have used a similar approach for proving convergence of systems to legitimate states. The theory has also been used in design of several multi-tolerant examples [12, 17] where tolerance to different types of faults is provided and the level of faulttolerance varies depending upon the severity of faults. In the context of automation of addition of fault-tolerance, the theory has been exploited in [6, 7, 11, 15, 17] . In the context of verification, simplified versions of this theory are applied in verification of time-triggered architectures [19] . It has also been used in software verification through separation of concerns [18] .
This work differs from the work on failure detectors (e.g., the line of research pioneered by Chandra and Toueg) in that the predicates being detected in [8, 9] are of the type "process j has failed". To the contrary, the predicates in our work are arbitrary state predicates. Moreover, in [8, 9] , the authors have considered detectors that are not perfect; similar detectors can also be constructed from the components in this paper. However, this issue is important in the context of a design methodology and is discussed in [4, 6, 17] . Thus, issues such as atomicity or perfectness of the faulttolerance components are outside the scope of this paper; in the context of analysis, the components contained in a faulttolerant program, by definition, would satisfy any atomicity restrictions imposed on that fault-tolerant program.
REAL-TIME PROGRAMS AND SPECIFICATIONS
In our framework, real-time programs are specified in terms of their state space and their transitions [2, 3] . The definition of specification is adapted from Alpern and Schneider [1] and Henzinger [13] .
Real-Time Programs
Let V = {v1, v2 · · · vn}, n ≥ 1, be a finite set of discrete variables and X = {x1, x2 · · · xm}, m ≥ 1, be a finite set of clock variables. Each discrete variable vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is associated with a finite domain Di of values. Each clock variable xj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, ranges over nonnegative real numbers (denoted R ≥0 ). A location is a function that maps discrete variables in V to a value from their respective domain. A clock constraint over X is a Boolean combination of formulae of the form x c or x − y c, where x, y ∈ X, c ∈ Z ≥0 , and is either < or ≤. We denote the set of all clock constraints over X by Φ(X). A clock valuation is a function ν : X → R ≥0 that assigns a real value to each clock variable.
For τ ∈ R ≥0 , we write ν + τ to denote ν(x) + τ for every clock variable x in X. Also, for λ ⊆ X, ν[λ := 0] denotes the clock valuation that assigns 0 to each x ∈ λ and agrees with ν over the rest of the clock variables in X. A state (denoted σ) is a pair (s, ν), where s is a location and ν is a clock valuation for X. Let u be a (discrete or clock) variable and σ be a state. We denote the value of u in state σ by u(σ). The set of all possible states is called the state space obtained from the associated variables. Definition 3.1 (computations) Let V and X be finite sets of discrete and clock variables respectively. A computation is a finite or infinite timed state sequence of the form σ = (σ0, τ0) → (σ1, τ1) → · · · iff the following conditions are satisfied (1) σi = (si, νi) is a state in the state space of V and X for all i ∈ Z ≥0 , and (2) the sequence τ0, τ1, · · · (called the global time), where τi ∈ R ≥0 for all i ∈ Z ≥0 , satisfies the following constraints:
• (time consistency) for all i ∈ Z ≥0 , (1) if τi < τi+1 then si = si+1 and νi+1(x) = νi(x) + (τi+1 − τi) for all x ∈ X, and (2) if τi = τi+1 then νi+1 = νi[λ := 0] for some λ, where λ ⊆ X. Notice that in Definition 3.1, we do not specify an initial value for the global time. Now, let Σ be any set of computations. We require that Σ must be closed with respect to time offsets. That is, ∀σ ∈ Σ : ∀t ∈ R : (σ + t) ∈ Σ, where σ + t denotes the computation (σ0, τ0 + t) → (σ1, τ1 + t) → · · · , st. τ0 + t ≥ 0.
Notation.
Let σi denote the pair (σi, τi) in computation σ. Also, let α be a finite computation of length n and β be a finite or infinite computation. The concatenation of α and β (denoted αβ) is a computation, iff states αn−1 and β 0 meet the constraints of Definition 3.1. Otherwise, the result of concatenation is null. If Γ and Ψ are two sets containing finite and finite/infinte computations respectively, then ΓΨ = {αβ | (α ∈ Γ) ∧ (β ∈ Ψ) }. Definition 3.2 (suffix and fusion closure) Suffix closure of a set of computations means that if a computation σ is in that set then so are all the suffixes of σ. Fusion closure of a set of computations means that if computations α(σ, τ )γ and β(σ, τ )ψ are in that set then so are the computations α(σ, τ )ψ and β(σ, τ )γ, where α and β are computation prefixes, γ and ψ are computation suffixes, and σ is a state at global time τ . Definition 3.3 (real-time programs) A real-time program P is specified by the tuple VP , XP , ΠP where VP is a finite set of discrete variables, XP is a finite set of clock variables, and ΠP is a suffix closed and fusion closed set of infinite maximal computations in the state space of P. By maximal, we mean that if σ = αβ is in ΠP , where
and (3) for all j > n, sj = sj+1 and νj+1 = νj + (τj+1 − τj), then no other computation in ΠP has a prefix of α. In other words, given a computation prefix α of P, P does not contain the computation that stutters σn+1 infinitely if there exists other computation of P that extends α.
Observation.
One can observe that Definitions 3.1 and 3.3 allow real-time programs (and later specifications) to exhibit Zeno behavior. The reason is due to the fact that when we develop the theory of fault-tolerance components, we allow components to exhibit Zeno behavior. However, as we will illustrate, it is important that the collection of components in a program does not exhibit Zeno behavior. Definition 3.4 (state predicates) A state predicate S of a program P = VP , XP , ΠP is any subset of state space of P st. in the corresponding Boolean expression, clock constraints are in Φ(XP ), i.e., the magnitude of clock variables are nonnegative integers. Definition 3.5 (closure) We say that a state predicate S is closed in P = VP , XP , ΠP iff in every computation (σ0, τ0) → (σ1, τ1) → · · · in ΠP , if σj |= S (i.e., state predicate S holds in state σj), j ∈ Z ≥0 , then σ k |= S, for all k, k ≥ j. Definition 3.6 (S-computations) Let S be a state predicate and P = VP , XP , ΠP be a program.
The S-computations of P, denoted as P | S, is the set of all computations in ΠP that start in a state where S is true.
Example
We use the following example throughout the paper as a running demonstration. Consider a one-lane turn-based bridge where cars can travel in only one direction at any time. The bridge is controlled by two traffic signals and each signal changes phase from green to yellow and then to red, based on a set of timing constraints. Moreover, if one signal is red, it will turn green some time after the other signal turns red. A traffic controller program (T C) for the bridge has two discrete variables to represent the status of the signals, i.e., VT C = {sig 0 , sig 1 }, where sig 0 and sig 1 range over {G, Y, R} . Thus, at any time, the values of sig 0 and sig 1 show in which direction cars are traveling. Moreover, for each signal, T C has three timers to change signal phase, i.e., XT C = {xi, yi, zi | i = 0, 1}. When a signal turns green, it may turn yellow within 10 time units, but not sooner than 1 time unit. Subsequently, the signal may turn red between 1 and 2 time units after it turns yellow. Finally, when the signal is red, it may turn green within 1 time unit after the other signal becomes red. Both signals operate identically.
To concisely present computations of a program, we use timed guarded commands. Notice that since the set of computations of a program is suffix closed and fusion closed, the program can be written in terms of transitions that it can execute [5] . A timed guarded command (also called timed action) is of the form L :: g λ − → st, where L is a label, g is a state predicate, st is a statement that describes how the program state is updated, and λ is a set of clock variables that are reset by execution of L. Thus, L denotes the set of transitions {(s0, ν) → (s1, ν[λ := 0]) | g is true in state (s0, ν), and s1 is obtained by changing s0 as prescribed by st}. A guarded wait command (also called delay action) is of the form L :: g −→ wait, where g identifies the set of states from where delay transitions with arbitrary durations are allowed to be taken as long as g continuously remains true.
Thus, the traffic controller program is as follows. For i ∈ {0, 1}:
where j = (i + 1) mod 2. We note that the choice of execution of timed guarded commands is non-deterministic, i.e., a guarded command whose guard is true is non-deterministically chosen for execution at each time instance. Notice that the guard of T C3i depends on z timer of signal j. For simplicity, we assume that once a traffic light turns green, all cars from the opposite direction have already left the bridge.
Specifications
Definition 3.7 (specifications) A specification (or property), denoted SPEC , is a tuple VSPEC , XSPEC , ΣSPEC where VSPEC is a finite set of discrete variables, XSPEC is a finite set of clock variables, and ΣSPEC is a suffix closed and fusion closed set of infinite computations in the state space of SPEC .
We now define what it means for a program to refine a specification and what it means for a program P (typically, a fault-tolerant program) to refine a program P (typically, a fault-intolerant program). Essentially, we would like to say that 'P refines P' iff computations of P are a subset of that in P. However, if P is obtained by adding fault-tolerance to P then P may contain additional variables that are not in P. Hence, it will be necessary to project the computations of P on (the variables of) P and then check if the projected computation is a computation of P. Definition 3.8 (state projection) Let P = VP , XP , ΠP and P = V P , X P , Π P be real-time programs st. V P = VP ∪ ∆v and X P = XP ∪ ∆x for some ∆v and ∆x. The projection of a state of P on P is a state obtained by considering VP ∪ XP only, i.e., by abstracting away the variables in ∆v ∪ ∆x. The same concept applies to programs and specifications. Extending this definition for computations, we say that the projection of a computation of P on P (respectively, SPEC ) is a computation obtained by projecting each state in that computation on P (respectively, SPEC ).
Definition 3.9 (refines)
Let P = VP , XP , ΠP and P = V P , X P , Π P be real-time programs, S be a state predicate and SPEC = VSPEC , XSPEC , ΣSPEC be a specification. We say that P refines P (respectively, SPEC ) from S iff the following two conditions hold: (1) S is closed in P , and (2) for every computation in Π P that starts in a state where S is true, the projection of that computation on P (respectively, SPEC ) is a computation of ΠP (respectively, ΣSPEC ).
In order to reason about the correctness of programs (in the absence of faults), we define the notion of program invariant.
Definition 3.10 (invariants) Let P be a real-time program, S be a nonempty state predicate, and SPEC be a specification. We say that S is an invariant of P for SPEC iff P refines SPEC from S.
We note that our rather unconventional definition of invariant is due to the fact that in our framework, an invariant has double role. First, it specifies the closure of a program in the absence of faults. Thus, starting from a set of initial states, one possible invariant can simply be the set of reachable states. Secondly, as we will describe in Section 4, the invariant predicate also specifies a set of legitimate states which in turn determines the reachability condition of a program for recovery when faults occur.
Whenever the specification is clear from the context, we will omit it; thus, "S is an invariant of P" abbreviates "S is an invariant of P for SPEC ". Note that Definition 3.9 introduces the notion of refinement with respect to infinite computations. In case of finite computations, we characterize them by determining whether they can be extended to an infinite computation in the specification. Definition 3.11 (maintains) Let P be a real-time program, S be a state predicate, and SPEC be a specification. We say that program P maintains SPEC from S iff (1) S is closed in P, and (2) for all computation prefixes α of P that start from S, there exists a computation suffix β st. the projection of αβ on SPEC is in SPEC . We say that P violates SPEC from S iff it is not the case that P maintains SPEC from S.
We note that if P refines SPEC from S then P maintains SPEC from S as well, but the reverse direction does not always hold. We, in particular, introduce the notion of maintains for computations that a (fault-intolerant) program cannot produce, but the computation can be extended to one that is in SPEC via adding a δ-corrector component to the intolerant program (see Sections 4, 6 for details). Specifying timing constraints.
In order to express time-related behaviors of real-time programs (e.g., deadlines and recovery time), we focus on a standard property typically used in real-time computing known as the stable bounded response property. A stable bounded response property, denoted P → ≤δ Q, where P and Q are two state predicates and δ ∈ Z ≥0 , is the set of all computations (σ0, τ0) → (σ1, τ1) → · · · in which, for all i ≥ 0, if σi |= P then there exists j, j ≥ i, st. (1) σj |= Q, (2) τj − τi ≤ δ, and (3) for all k, i ≤ k < j, σ k |= P , i.e., it is always the case that a state in P is followed by a state in Q within δ time units and P remains true until Q becomes true. We call P the event predicate, Q the response (or recovery) predicate, and δ the response (or recovery) time.
Assumption 3.12 We assume that the set of clock variables of any stable bounded response property P → ≤δ Q contains a special clock variable, which gets reset whenever P becomes true. This assumption is necessary to ensure that stable bounded response properties are fusion closed.
The specifications considered in this paper are an intersection of a safety specification and a liveness specification [1, 13] . In particular, we concentrate on a special case where the specification is the intersection of (1) timing independent safety characterized by a set of bad instantaneous transitions (denoted SPEC bt ), (2) timing dependent safety characterized by a set of stable bounded response properties (denoted SPEC br ), and (3) liveness. , where s0 and s1 are two locations and λ ⊆ XSPEC . We denote the specification whose computations have no transition in SPEC bt by SPEC bt .
(timing constraints)
We denote SPEC br by the conjunction V m i=0 (Pi → ≤δ i Qi), for state predicates Pi and Qi, and, response times δi. Thus, given a specification SPEC , one can implicitly identify SPEC bt and SPEC br as defined above. Throughout the paper, SPEC br is meant to prescribe how a program should meet its timing constraints such as providing bounded-time recovery to its normal behavior after the occurrence of faults. We formally define the notion of recovery in Section 4.
Definition 3.14 (liveness specifications)
A liveness specification of SPEC is a set of computations that meets the following condition: for each computation prefix α, there exists an infinite computation β st. αβ ∈ SPEC .
Example (cont'd)
Following Definition 3.13, the safety specification of T C comprises of SPEC bt T C and SPEC br T C . SPEC bt T C is the set of transitions where both signals are not red in their target states:
We define SPEC br of T C in Section 4, where we formally define the notion of bounded-time recovery.
One invariant for the program T C is the following:
where j = (i + 1) mod 2 and ⊕ denotes the exclusive or operator. It is straightforward to see that T C refines SPEC bt T C from ST C .
FAULT MODEL AND FAULT-TOLERANCE

Fault Model
Intuitively, the faults that a program is subject to are systematically represented by the union of transitions whose execution perturbs the program state and transitions that unexpectedly advance time.
Definition 4.1 (faults) Let P = VP , XP , ΠP be a realtime program. The set f of faults is specified by the union of the following two sets:
We emphasize that such representation is possible notwithstanding the type of faults (be they stuck-at, crash, fail-stop, timing, performance, Byzantine, message loss, etc.), the nature of the faults (be they permanent, transient, or intermittent), or the ability of the program to observe the effects of the faults (be they detectable or undetectable).
Let P = VP , XP , ΠP be a program and f be a set of faults. We denote the program P in the presence of f by
is obtained by inserting transitions of f in computations of ΠP . Formally, let Z be a set of computations and • be the operator that fuses two (finite or infinite) computations of Z st.
•
.e., •(Z) adds additional computations obtained by inserting timed state (σ, τ ) to computations in the given set. Also, let
. Now, we define the computations of P in the presence of f as follows:
Just as we use invariants to show program correctness in the absence of faults, we use fault-spans to show the correctness of programs in the presence of faults. Definition 4.3 (fault-spans) Let P = VP , XP , ΠP be a real-time program with invariant S, T be a state predicate, and f be a set of fault transitions. We say that T is an fspan of P from S iff (1) S ⊆ T , and (2) T is closed in Π P[]f .
Example (cont'd)
T C is subject to clock reset faults due to circuit malfunctions. In particular, we consider faults that reset either z0 or z1 at any state in the invariant ST C (cf. Subsection 3.2), without changing the location of T C. Formally,
It is straightforward to see that in the presence of F0 and F1, T C may violate SPEC bt T C . For instance, if F1 occurs when T C is in a state of ST C where (sig 0 = sig 1 = R) ∧ (z0 ≤ 1) ∧ (z1 > 1), in the resulting state, we have (sig 0 = sig 1 = R) ∧ (z0 ≤ 1) ∧ (z1 = 0). From this state, immediate execution of timed actions T C30 and then T C31 results in a state where (sig 0 = sig 1 = G), which is clearly a violation of the safety specification SPEC bt T C . In our traffic controller example, for simplicity, we assume that faults F0 and F1 only occur in a state where ST C holds (i.e., faults do not re-occur outside the invariant of T C).
Fault-Tolerance
We now define what we mean by fault-tolerance in the context of real-time programs. Obviously, in the absence of faults, a program should refine its specification. In the presence of faults, however, it may not refine its specification and, hence, it may refine some 'tolerance specification'. These specifications are based on refinement of a combination of (timing independent) safety, liveness, timing constraints, and a desirable bounded-time recovery mechanism in the presence of faults. The resulting tolerance specification with respect to each combination, defines a level of fault-tolerance. In this paper, we focus on the strongest level, known as hard-masking fault-tolerance [6] . Intuitively, given a specification SPEC , the hard-masking tolerance specification of SPEC is identical to SPEC . In other words, the occurrence of all faults are masked. Moreover, we require SPEC to prescribe a bounded-time recovery mechanism.
Definition 4.4 (hard-masking tolerance specification)
Let SPEC = VSPEC , XSPEC , ΣSPEC be a specification where SPEC ⇒ (¬R → ≤θ R) for some recovery predicate R and some recovery time θ ∈ Z ≥0 . The hard-masking tolerance specification of SPEC is SPEC . We are now ready to define what it means for a program to be hard-masking f -tolerant. With the intuition that a program is hard-masking f -tolerant to SPEC if it refines SPEC in the absence of faults and it refines the hard-masking tolerance specification of SPEC in the presence of f , we define 'hard-masking f -tolerant to SPEC from S' as follows.
Definition 4.5 (hard-masking programs)
Let P be a real-time program with invariant S, f be a set of fault transitions, SPEC be a specification, and θ be a nonnegative integer. We say that P is hard-masking f -tolerant to SPEC with recovery time θ from S iff the following two conditions hold:
• P refines SPEC from S, and
• there exists T st. T ⊇ S and P[]f refines the hardmasking tolerance specification of SPEC for recovery time θ and recovery predicate S from T .
Example (cont'd)
Thus, the fault-tolerant version of T C has to, first, reach a state where both signals are red and subsequently recover to ST C where exactly one signal turns green. To this end, we specify the following stable bounded-response properties:
where QT C = ∀i ∈ {0, 1} : ((sig i = R) ∧ (zi > 1)). The response times in SPEC br T C are simply two arbitrary numbers for illustration.
Below, we present a hard-masking version of our traffic controller program, denoted by T C , where i ∈ {0, 1} and j = (i + 1) mod 2:
where t1 and t2 are the special clock variables that accompany stable bounded response properties in SPEC br T C (cf. Assumption 3.12). In Sections 5 and 6, we demonstrate how we decompose T C into T C and its fault-tolerance components.
DETECTORS AND THEIR ROLE IN HARD-MASKING PROGRAMS
This section is organized as follows. We formally introduce the notion of detector components in Subsection 5.1. In Subsection 5.2, we precisely define what we mean by containment of a detector in a real-time program. Then, we present detector components of the hard-masking version of our traffic controller in Subsection 5.3. Finally, in Subsection 5.4, we develop the theory of detectors by proving the necessity of existence of hard-masking detectors in hard-masking fault-tolerant programs.
Detectors
Intuitively, a detector is a program component that ensures satisfaction of timing independent safety (i.e., SPEC bt in Definition 3.13).
Definition 5.1 (detects) Let W and D be state predicates. Let 'W detects D' be the specification, that is the set of all infinite computations σ = (σ0, τ0) → (σ1, τ1) → · · · , satisfying the following three conditions:
(In other words, σi |= (W ⇒ D).)
• (Stability) There exists i ∈ Z ≥0 , st. for all j, j ≥ i, if σj |= W then σj+1 |= W or σj+1 |= D. A detector D = VD, XD, ΠD is used to check whether its "detection predicate", D, is true. Since D satisfies Progress from U , in any computation in ΠD, if U ∧ D is true continuously, D eventually detects this fact and makes W true. Since D satisfies Safeness from U , it follows that D never lets W witness D incorrectly. Moreover, since D satisfies Stability from U , it follows that once W becomes true, it continues to be true unless D is falsified. In the context of fault-tolerance, D is typically a predicate of the faultintolerant program from where safety should be always satisfied and W is a predicate of the fault-tolerant program that witnesses the detection of D.
In order to analyze the behavior of a detector in the presence of faults, we consider the notion of hard-masking tolerant detectors. More specifically, a detector D is a hardmasking tolerant detector if SPEC is substituted by 'W detects D' in Definition 4.5.
Containment of Detectors in Real-Time Programs
In order to show the existence of detectors in hard-masking fault-tolerant programs, we would like to show that the program contains a detector for a detection predicate associated with the fault-intolerant program. However, we need to identify syntactic characteristics of a program before detection predicates can be identified. In particular, since a detector is used to ensure that the execution of an action is safe, its witness predicate must be used by the fault-tolerant program. Intuitively, the syntactic constraints identified in this section require the witness predicate to be a guard of the corresponding action in the fault-tolerant program.
In order to accomplish our goal, first, we show that violation of timing independent safety (i.e., SPEC bt in Definition 3.13) can be merely determined by considering transitions in SPEC bt .
Lemma 5.3 Let SPEC be a specification, α be a computation prefix, σ and σ be two states, and τ, τ ∈ R ≥0 , where
In Lemma 5.4, we show that there exists a set of states from where execution of programs maintains SPEC bt . We call such a state predicate a detection predicate for SPEC bt . We now prove the uniqueness of the weakest detection predicate for a given program P.
Lemma 5.5 Given a program P = VP , XP , ΠP and a specification SPEC , there exists a unique weakest detection predicate of P for SPEC bt .
We are now ready to define what it means for a program to contain detectors. As mentioned in Subsection 3.1.1, since the set of computations of a program is suffix closed and fusion closed, the program can be written in terms of timed guarded commands. Given a timed guarded command, say L :: Guard λ − → st, Lemma 5.5 shows that there exists a unique weakest detection predicate, say wdp, from where execution of L does not violate SPEC bt . Hence, to show the existence of detectors, we require the detection predicate of such a timed action to be Guard ∧ wdp. Furthermore, to show that the fault-tolerant program contains the desired detector, we show that it must be using the witness predicate of that detector to ensure that execution of the corresponding timed action is safe. Towards this end, we define the notion of encapsulation. Intuitively, if (typically, a fault-tolerant) program P encapsulates (typically, a fault-intolerant) program P then for each timed action of P of the form Guard λ − → st, P contains a timed action of the form Guard ∧ Guard λ∪λ − −− → st||st . The semantic of st||st corresponds to the statement where st and st are executed simultaneously, clock variables in λ ∪ λ are reset, and the timed action is executed only when its guard, Guard ∧ g , is true. In other words, P has a timed action corresponding to each timed action of P (possibly) with a stronger guard, additional assignments in st , and additional clock variables in λ . Notice that the assignments in st and clock variables in λ may be added in order to add fault-tolerance to P (cf. the notion of projection in Subsection 3.2). To show that P is using a detector for a timed action of P, we require the witness predicate of that detector to be Guard ∧ Guard which is the guard of the corresponding timed action in P . Definition 5.6 (encapsulates) Let P = VP , XP , ΠP and P = V P , X P , Π P be two real-time programs and S be a state predicate. We say that P encapsulates P from S iff each timed action in P that is enabled in a state in S and that updates variables in VP is of the form Guard ∧ g λ∪λ − −− → st||st , where Guard λ − → st is a timed action of P and st does not update variables in VP and λ ∩ XP = {}.
Based on the above discussion, given a timed guarded command of the form Guard λ − → st of P, its (weakest) detection predicate wdp and the corresponding action Guard ∧ Guard λ∪λ − −− → st||st of P , we require the detection predicate of the desired detector to be Guard ∧ wdp and the witness predicate of the desired detector to be Guard ∧ Guard .
Finally, in order to formalize the notion of containment and existence of detectors, we need to define what it means to obtain a fault-tolerant program by reusing its fault-intolerant version.
Definition 5.7 (reuses) Let P and P be two real-time programs. We say that P reuses P from S iff the following two conditions are satisfied:
• P refines P from S, and • P encapsulates P from S.
Example (cont'd)
It is straightforward to see that the weakest detection predicate for T Ci is:
where i ∈ {0, 1} and j = (i + 1) mod 2. Thus, in program T C (cf. Subsection 4.2), the guard of T C3i is strengthened in order for T C to refine SPEC bt T C in the presence of faults. Intuitively, T C is allowed to change phase from red to green only when the other signal is red. More precisely, T C uses the detector D T C i which consists of timed guarded commands T C 1i, T C 2i, and T C 4i with the following detection and witness predicates:
It is easy to see that that W T C i detects D T C i in D T C i from ST C in both absence and presence of F0 and F1. Notice that D T C i exhibits Zeno behavior since when the witness predicate becomes true, there does not exist a timed guarded command whose guard is enabled except T C 4i. However, it is important that the entire program does not show Zeno behavior. For instance, one can observe that, T C 3i ensures time progress for T C .
The Necessity of Existence of Detectors in Hard-Masking Programs
Based on the formalization of the notion of containment, we are now ready to prove that hard-masking programs contain hard-masking tolerant detectors. Our strategy to accomplish our goal is as follows. First, based on Definitions 5.6 and 5.7, we show that if a program refines SPEC bt in the absence of faults then it contains detectors. The intuition is that if program P is designed by transforming P so as to refine SPEC bt , then the transformation must have added detectors for P, and P reuses P. We formulate this in Claim 5.10. Then (in the presence of faults), using Claim 5.10, we show that if a hard-masking program P is designed by reusing P to tolerate a set f of faults, P contains a hardmasking tolerant detector for each action of P. This is shown in Theorem 5.11.
In order to show that a program contains a detector component, we are required to show that the corresponding timed guarded commands satisfy the Progress condition of Definition 5.1. Thus, we assume that programs need to satisfy the following fairness condition.
Assumption 5.8 We assume that program computations are fair in the sense that in every computation, if the guard of an action is continuously true then that action is eventually chosen for execution. Assumption 5.9 Without loss of generality, for simplicity, we assume that transitions that correspond to different actions of the program are mutually disjoint, i.e., they do not contain overlapping transitions. The results in this paper are valid without this assumption since we can easily modify a given program to one that satisfies this assumption.
We are now ready to formulate our claim on existence of detectors in programs that refine SPEC bt in the absence of faults.
Claim 5.10 Let P and P be real-time programs, S be a nonempty state predicate, and SPEC be a specification. If
• P reuses P from S, and • P refines SPEC bt from S, then
• (∀ac | ac is a timed action of P : P contains a detector of a detection predicate of ac for SPEC ). Now, we show that if a hard-masking f -tolerant program P is designed by reusing P then P contains a hard-masking tolerant detector for each action in P.
Theorem 5.11 Let P and P be real-time programs, S be a nonempty state predicate, f be a set of faults, and SPEC be a specification. If
• P refines SPEC bt from S, • P reuses P from R, where R ⇒ S for some nonempty state predicate R, and • P is hard-masking f -tolerant to SPEC from R then
• (∀ac | ac is a timed action of P : P is a hardmasking f -tolerant detector of a detection predicate of ac for SPEC ).
δ-CORRECTORS AND THEIR ROLE IN HARD-MASKING PROGRAMS
This section is organized as follows. We formally introduce the notion of weak and strong δ-corrector components in Subsection 6.1. In Subsection 6.2, we define what we mean by containment of a δ-corrector in a real-time program. Then, we present δ-corrector components of the hardmasking version of our traffic controller in Subsection 6.3. Finally, in Subsections 6.4 and 6.5, we develop the theory of strong and weak δ-correctors, respectively, by proving the necessity of existence of hard-masking weak and strong δ-correctors in hard-masking fault-tolerant programs.
Weak and Strong δ-Correctors
Intuitively, a δ-corrector is a program component that ensures bounded-time recovery to a correction predicate. In fault-tolerant computing, recovery is essential to guarantee that liveness properties (cf. Definition 3.14) and timing constraints (cf. SPEC br in Definition 3.13) are met where the state of a program is perturbed by the occurrence of faults. Depending upon the closure of the correction predicate in δ-correctors, they are classified into weak and strong.
Definition 6.1 (weakly corrects)
Let C and W be state predicates. Let 'W weakly corrects C within δ' be the specification, that is the set of all infinite computations σ = (σ0, τ0) → (σ1, τ1) → · · · , satisfying the following conditions:
• (Safeness) For all i ∈ Z ≥0 , if σi |= W then σi |= C.
• (Stability) There exists i ∈ Z ≥0 , st. for all j, j ≥ i, if σj |= W then σj+1 |= W or σj+1 |= C.
Definition 6.2 (strongly corrects)
Let C and W be state predicates. Let 'W strongly corrects C within δ' be the specification, that is the set of all infinite computations σ, satisfying the following two conditions:
• W weakly corrects C within δ, and
Definition 6.3 (δ-correctors) Let C be a program and C, W , and U be state predicates of C. We say that W weakly/strongly corrects C in C from U (i.e., C is a weak/strong δ-corrector) iff C refines 'W weakly/strongly corrects C within δ' from U .
Similar to the concept of tolerant detectors, in order to analyze the behavior of a δ-corrector C in the presence of faults, we consider the notion of hard-masking tolerant δ-correctors. More specifically, a weak/strong δ-corrector C is a hard-masking tolerant weak/strong δ-corrector if SPEC is substituted by 'W weakly/strongly corrects C within δ' in Definition 4.5.
Notice that since C satisfies Weak (respectively, Strong) Convergence from U , it follows that C reaches a state where C becomes true within δ time units (and, respectively, C continues to be true thereafter). In addition to convergence, a δ-corrector never lets the predicate W witness the correction predicate C incorrectly, as C satisfies Safeness from U . Moreover, since C satisfies Progress from U , it follows that W eventually becomes true. And, finally, since C satisfies Stability from U , it follows that when W becomes true, W is never falsified.
Containment of δ-Correctors in
Real-Time Programs
As mentioned earlier, in the context of real-time programs, δ-correctors ensure bounded-time recovery to their correction predicate. Intuitively, we will use weak δ-correctors where we need refinement of stable bounded response properties in the presence of faults. In such properties, when the event predicate becomes true, the program needs to reach a state where the response predicate holds within the respective recovery time. Nonetheless, the program does not need to remain in the response predicate.
Unlike weak δ-correctors, we will use strong δ-correctors where we need bounded-time recovery to a state predicate in which the program is required to stay in. The correction predicate of a δ-corrector C is typically an invariant predicate of the fault-intolerant program while the witness predicate witnesses the correction of the correction predicate. This is obviously due to the fact that real-time programs are closed in their invariant predicate. Existence of strong δ-correctors are of special interest, since recovery to the invariant predicate automatically ensures refinement of the liveness specification. In particular, in Subsection 6.4, we show the necessity of existence of strong δ-correctors in hard-masking programs in order to refine the property ¬S → ≤θ S (cf. Definition 4.4), where S is in invariant predicate.
In terms of the behavior of δ-correctors, observe that in Definition 6.1 (and, hence, Definition 6.2 as well), state σ0 is the earliest state from where recovery must commence. Thus, τi is the time instance where correction is complete and τi − τ0 is the duration of correction. In case of strong δ-correctors, σ0 is also the earliest state reached outside the invariant due to occurrence of faults.
We note that although detectors and δ-correctors share three identical constraints, their semantics of containment are completely different. Intuitively, a detector uses the witness predicate in order to detect whether program execution is safe. Hence, as we developed the theory of detectors in Section 5, we imposed constraints that require the witness predicate to be used. To the contrary, a program may not use the witness predicate of a δ-corrector, as a fault-tolerant program may not need to know when correction is complete.
Example (cont'd)
Continuing with our traffic controller example, we identify δ-correctors for each stable bounded-response property in SPEC br T C introduced in Subsection 4.2. To this end, first, consider the property ¬ST C → ≤3 Q. When T C[]{F0, F1} reaches a state in ¬ST C ∧ ¬Q where at least one signal is red and the value of both z timers is less than or equal to 1, it needs to recover to Q within 3 time units. Let C 1 T C be the weak 3-corrector in T C consisting of timed actions T C 5i and T C 6i with correction and witness predicates both equal to Q. Intuitively, C 1 T C ensures that when T C is in a state outside the invariant, it reaches a state where both signals are red within 3 time units.
Likewise, for the property ¬ST C → ≤7 ST C , let C 2 T C be the strong 7-corrector consisting of timed actions T C 7i and T C 8i with witness and corrections predicates equal to ST C . In C 2 T C , a z timer gets reset when the state of T C is in ¬ST C ∧ Q within 7 time units since the occurrence of a fault. Such a reset takes the traffic controller back to its invariant predicate ST C where timed action T C1i is enabled. Notice that unlike the the entire program T C , both C 
The Necessity of Existence of Strong
δ-Correctors in Hard-Masking Programs
We are now ready to prove that hard-masking programs contain hard-masking tolerant strong δ-correctors. Our strategy to accomplish our goal is as follows. First, in Claim 6.5, we show that in the absence of faults, if a program refines a specification within θ time units then it contains strong δ-correctors for some δ ∈ Z ≥0 . Then, (in the presence of faults), using Claim 6.5, we show that if a hard-masking program P is designed by reusing P to tolerate a set f of faults, P contains a hard-masking tolerant strong δ-corrector. This is shown in Theorem 6.8.
Notation.
For simplicity, we use the pseudo-arithmetic expressions to denote timing constraints over finite computations. For instance, σ ≤δ , denotes a finite computation (σ0, τ0) → (σ1, τ1) → · · · (σn, τn) that satisfies the timing constraint τn − τ0 ≤ δ, where δ ∈ Z ≥0 . We use S * to denote a finite computation (σ0, τ0) → (σ1, τ1) → · · · (σn, τn) st. σi |= S for all i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, (true) * ≤∞ denotes an arbitrary finite computation with no specific time bound. Definition 6.4 (becomes) Let P = VP , XP , ΠP and P = V P , X P , Π P be two real-time programs. We say that P becomes P within θ from T iff P refines (true) * ≤θ ΠP from T .
In Claim 6.5, we show that given a program P, state predicate S, and specification SPEC , where P refines SPEC from S, if a program P is designed st. it behaves like P within θ and, thus, has a suffix in SPEC , then P is a strong δ-corrector of an invariant predicate of P for some δ ∈ Z ≥0 . We prove this Claim by showing that P itself refines the required strong δ-corrector specification.
Claim 6.5 Let P and P be real-time programs, S and T be nonempty state predicates, SPEC be a specification, and θ be a nonnegative integer. If
• P refines SPEC from S, • P refines P from S, and • P becomes P|S within θ from T , then
• there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 st. P is a strong δ-corrector of S.
The next lemma generalizes Claim 6.5. In general, given a program P that refines SPEC from S, P may not behave like P from each state in S but only from a subset of S, say R. This may happen, for example, if P contains additional variables and P behaves like P only after the values of these additional variables are restored. Lemma 6.6 shows that in such a case, P contains a hard-masking tolerant strong δ-corrector of an invariant predicate of P. The strong δ-corrector is hard-masking in the sense that the correction predicate is preserved only after P reaches a state where R is true.
Lemma 6.6 Let P and P be real-time programs, R, S, and T be nonempty state predicates where R ⇒ S, SPEC be a specification, and θ be a nonnegative integer. If
• P refines SPEC from S, • P refines P from R, and • P becomes (P|R) within θ from T , then
• there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 st. P is a hard-masking strong δ-corrector with recovery time θ of S.
We now illustrate the role of strong δ-correctors in hard-masking programs in the presence of faults. In particular, we use Claim 6.5 and Lemma 6.6 to show that if a hard-masking f -tolerant program P with recovery time θ is designed by reusing P then there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 st. P contains a hard-masking f -tolerant strong δ-corrector with recovery time θ for an invariant predicate of P. Notice that, since our goal is to identify components that provide bounded-time recovery in the presence of faults, there needs to be some bound on the number of occurrence of faults. In fact, it is straightforward to show that providing boundedtime recovery in the presence of unbounded occurrence of faults is generally impossible. Assumption 6.7 Let P = VP , XP , ΠP be a program with invariant predicate S and f be a set of faults. Also, let (σ0, τ0) → (σ1, τ1) → · · · (σn, τn) be a computation prefix in Π P[]f where σ0 |= S and σi |= S, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We assume that the number of occurrence of faults between states σ1 and σn is at most k for some k ∈ Z ≥0 . Theorem 6.8 Let P and P be real-time programs, R and S be nonempty state predicates, SPEC be a specification, and θ be a nonnegative integer. If
• P refines SPEC from S, • P is hard-masking f -tolerant for SPEC from R, where R ⇒ S, • P refines P from R, and • P becomes P|R within θ from T , where T is an f -span of P , then
• there exist δ and θ in Z ≥0 st. P is a hardmasking f -tolerant strong δ-corrector with recovery time θ of S.
The Necessity of Existence of Weak
δ-Correctors in Hard-Masking Programs
Just like the relation between recovery constraint and strong δ-correctors in hard masking programs, we show that if a hard-masking f -tolerant program P is designed by reusing program P then P contains a hard-masking tolerant weak δ-corrector for each stable bounded response property in SPEC br .
Theorem 6.9 Let P and P be real-time programs, R and S be nonempty state predicates where R ⇒ S, SPEC be a specification, and θ be a nonnegative integer. If
• P refines SPEC from S, • P reuses P from R, • P is hard-masking f -tolerant to SPEC from R then
• (∀i | 0 ≤ i ≤ m: there exists δ ∈ Z ≥0 st. P is a hard-masking tolerant weak δ-corrector for the response predicate of stable bounded response property Pi → ≤δ i Qi of SPEC br ).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we focused on a theory of fault-tolerance components in the context of hard-masking real-time programs. Our main contributions are we (1) identified three types of fault-tolerance components, namely, detectors, weak δ-correctors, and strong δ-correctors, (2) formally defined the notion of containment of components in real-time programs, and (3) showed that every hard-masking program can be decomposed into its fault-intolerant version and a collection of fault-tolerance components.
The significance of this work follows from the fact that detectors and correctors have been found to be useful for analysis of several fault-tolerant programs. Examples include Byzantine agreement, mutual exclusion, tree maintenance, leader election, termination detection, and bounded network management [10, 16, 18] . This work shows that such analysis is possible for all fault-tolerant programs that are designed from their fault-intolerant version. This work complements the results in [5] in that while [5] is focused on a design methodology, the current work focuses on analysis.
We are currently focusing on using these components in the context of automated addition of fault-tolerance to embedded systems. In particular, by designing and verifying these components in advance, it would be possible to speed up automated addition of fault-tolerance to real-time programs. Towards this end, we are working on extending our current work on automated addition of fault-tolerance [6, 7] to use pre-synthesized detectors and δ-correctors.
